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EXPERT DISCOVERY PROTECTIONS:
COMPARING DISTRICT COURTS WITH THE
PTAB
BLAINE M. HACKMAN, VI T. TRAN, AND KATHERINE A. HELM*
INTRODUCTION
Expert witness testimony can be critical in patent litigation in all
forums. In Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) proceedings,
particularly inter partes review (“IPR”) and post-grant review (“PGR”),
expert testimony through declarations and depositions plays a central
role in both challenging and defending patents. In district courts, live
expert testimony is key to proving infringement and invalidity.
Accordingly, the legal protections governing the disclosure of expert
testimony in discovery in both forums are carefully proscribed, but with
notable distinctions.
Under the expert discovery protections set forth in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), draft expert reports, any expert’s or
consultant’s personal notes, and the substance of communications
between or among any experts, consultants, and counsel are generally
not discoverable in district court litigation. FRCP 26(b)(4) explicitly
protects from discovery “drafts of any report or disclosure required . . .
regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded”1 and
“communications between the party’s attorney and any witness
required to provide a report.”2 There are three exceptions to this rule
which permit discovery into any communications between a party’s
attorney and an expert witness concerning: (1) any facts or data
provided by the attorney and considered by the expert in forming the
expert’s opinions; (2) any assumptions provided by an attorney and
* Blaine M. Hackman and Vi T. Tran are associates, and Katherine A. Helm is a partner, in
the New York office of Dechert LLP
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
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relied upon by an expert in forming opinions; and (3) the compensation
for the expert’s study and testimony.3
PTAB proceedings are not bound by the FRCP, but the PTAB has
adopted practices that are consistent with the FRCP.4 As in district court
litigation, PTAB trial rules require an expert to “disclose the underlying
facts or data on which the opinion is based.”5 PTAB case law has
encouraged practitioners to rigorously cross-examine expert declarants
on the information that they considered in coming to their opinion.6 At
the same time, PTAB rules protect from routine discovery information
that is attorney work product, extending these protections to “persons
involved in the preparation or filing of the documents or things.”7 Thus,
even though PTAB trial practice rules do not explicitly protect drafts and
communications related to the preparation of expert testimony,
attorney–expert communications have been protected during PTAB
proceedings in a manner similar to that in district court litigation.8
As described in Section III, infra, the PTAB has, however, granted
discovery into exchanges between an expert and counsel that go beyond
the scope of assumptions provided by attorneys and where evidence
suggests that the exchanged information may have formed the basis of
an expert’s testimony. The PTAB’s willingness to grant discovery into
these communications suggests that counsel cannot assume that FRCP
26(b)(4)-type protections will automatically protect all exchanges with
experts in PTAB proceedings. This article highlights instances where the
3. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i)-(iii).
4. See, e.g., Adobe Inc. v. RAH Color Techs. LLC, Nos. IPR2019-00627, IPR2019-00628,
IPR2019-00629, IPR2019-00646, Paper 59 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2019) (“[A]lthough the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern these proceedings, we note that FRCP Rule 26 is consistent
with our determination.”); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., No. IPR2018-01437, Paper
15 at 7 n.5 (P.T.A.B. July 10, 2019) (“Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply per
se to these proceedings, we note that the Federal Rules also contemplate that any communications
between a party’s attorney and its testifying expert are discoverable to the extent that they ‘identify
facts or data [or assumptions] that the party’s attorney provided and that the expert considered in
forming the opinions to be expressed.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(ii)–(iii)).
5. 37 C.F.R. § 42.65 (2013).
6. See, e.g., Adobe, Nos. IPR2019-00627, -00628, -00629, -00646, Paper 59 at 6 (“Thus, per
our rules (see 37 C.F.R. § 42.65(a)) and our guidance, the parties are encouraged to question the
expert on the facts, data, principles, and methods that the expert has considered in providing his
testimony.”)
7. 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii).
8. See, e.g., Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2014-00879,
Paper 16 at 2-3 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 20, 2015) (Denying a motion to depose Petitioner’s counsel on the
basis of privilege after Petitioner’s expert “made statements indicating that the underlining in
certain passages quoted in his declaration was made by or at the direction of Petitioner’s counsel.”);
GEA Process Eng’g, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., No. IPR2014-00041, Paper 52 at 2 (P.T.A.B. July 21,
2014) (indicating that draft declarations prepared before the expert’s signed declaration qualify
for privilege under work-product protection).
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PTAB granted discovery into attorney–expert communications, the
lessons learned from those decisions, and themes that provide guidance
for PTAB practitioners.
I.

THE ROLE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN PTAB PROCEEDINGS

In contrast to district court, PTAB proceedings do not typically
include live expert testimony, so the PTAB is unable to assess the
credibility of experts in person. But the PTAB has other procedural tools
to assign weight to expert testimony.9 The PTAB considers direct expert
testimony from expert declarations and cross-examination from
deposition transcripts,10 so an expert’s credibility is assessed based “on
the plausibility of [the expert’s] theories” presented in declarations and
depositions.11
The technical and legal expertise of a typical administrative patent
judge (“APJ”) is different from that of the average district court judge or
juror. APJs often have scientific or technical degrees and prior
experience practicing patent law. As a result, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has given leeway to APJs to
weigh expert testimony, and APJs have discretion to disregard expert
evidence in some circumstances.12 The PTAB is “entitled to weigh the
credibility of the witnesses in light of their qualifications and evaluate
their assertions accordingly.”13 The TPG states that an expert’s
credibility is critical.14 This weight resounds on appeal where the
Federal Circuit reviews PTAB factual findings under the substantial
evidence standard15 and has typically affirmed a relatively high
percentage of PTAB Final Written Decisions.16

9. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Consolidated Trial Practice Guide, (TPG) (November
2019) at 31-32.
10. Id. at 34, 73.
11. Id. at 32.
12. See, e.g., VirnetX Inc. v. Apple Inc., 665 F. App’x 880, 884 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (APJs, “because
of expertise, may more often find it easier to understand and soundly explain the teachings and
suggestions of prior art without expert assistance.”) (quoting Belden Inc. v. Berk–Tek LLC, 805 F.3d
1064, 1079 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
13. Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Illumina, Inc., 620 F. App’x 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
14. TPG at 34-35 (“The Board has broad discretion to assign weight to be accorded expert
testimony.”) (citing Yorkey v. Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
15. See VirnetX, 665 F. App’x at 882.
16. Dan Bagatell, Fed. Circ. Patent Decisions In 2019: An Empirical Review, LAW360 (Jan. 9,
2020) (In 2019, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s affirmance rate in PTAB appeals rose from 76% in 2018
and 2017 to 80% in 2019, but the district court affirmance rate fell slightly, to 73%.”).
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EXPERT DISCOVERY PROTECTIONS IN DISTRICT COURT

In district court litigation, FRCP 26 outlines the information and
materials that parties are required to disclose during the expert
discovery process, and the protections afforded to certain expert–
attorney communications. Patent litigators have grown accustomed to
the protections provided by FRCP 26(b)(4) when working with experts.
FRCP 26(b)(4)(B)-(C) were added in 2010 “to provide work-product
protection for attorney–expert communications regardless of the form
of the communications, whether oral, written, electronic, or otherwise”
and “to protect counsel’s work product and ensure that lawyers may
interact with retained experts without fear of exposing those
communications to searching discovery.”17 However, the advisory
committee added that these protections “do not impede discovery about
the opinions to be offered by the expert or the development, foundation,
or basis of those opinions.”18 Accordingly, communications relating to
the identification of facts, data, or assumptions provided by counsel and
considered by the expert, as well as expert compensation, must be
disclosed.19 Otherwise, discovery is permitted only in limited
circumstances and by court order.20
In district court litigation, the party seeking discovery has the
burden to show that the discovery request falls within an appropriate
exception to the discovery protections.21 For example, in Medicines Co.
v. Mylan Inc., Defendant’s counsel admitted that it had provided the
expert report of a first expert to a second expert, and that certain text in
the second expert’s report was copied from the first expert’s report.22
Plaintiff argued it was entitled to discovery relating to the details of this
exchange, but the district court denied Plaintiff’s motion and held that
although Plaintiff was entitled to facts and data, “further
communications about the potential relevance of the facts or data that
may have been provided to [the second expert] are protected from
17. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note.
18. Id.
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)(i)-(iii).
20. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note.
21. Sarkees v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. 17-cv-651V, 2019 WL 1375088, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (denying additional discovery based on FRCP 26(b)(4) where there was
no evidence to “suggest[] that plaintiffs’ counsel instructed [plaintiff’s expert] to assume the truth
of any of plaintiffs’ contentions or to guide her analysis down any particular path.” ); In re Cook
Med., Inc., No. 1:14-ml-2570, 2018 WL 6113466, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2018) (finding “identity of
the person who typed which portions of the report is not ‘facts or data’ or an assumption that the
expert considered or relied upon in ‘forming the opinions to be expressed’ in the report”).
22. No. 11-cv-1285, 2013 WL 2926944, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 13, 2013).

EXPERT DISCOVERY PROTECTIONS

508

CHICAGO-KENT J. INTELL. PROP.| PTAB BAR ASSOCIATION

5/26/2020 6:41 PM

Vol 19:4

discovery” under FRCP 26(b)(4).23 As described below, a PTAB panel
may not afford similarly broad protection to such information in an IPR
or PGR.
III.

APPLYING ATTORNEY–EXPERT PROTECTIONS TO THE
PREPARATION OF AN EXPERT’S DECLARATION IN PTAB
PROCEEDINGS

While the Federal Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of
evidence in PTAB proceedings, the PTAB has stated that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern PTAB proceedings.24 The PTAB
has indicated attorney–expert communications are generally protected
by work-product privilege, but that such privilege does not protect
information provided by an attorney to an expert, or between two
experts, if the expert considered that information to develop an
opinion.25 Draft declarations are also protected by privilege in PTAB
proceedings, but privilege may not protect drafts from discovery if there
is evidence that a declaration was drafted or modified without
significant expert involvement.26 A party’s failure to explicitly assert
“work-product” privilege to protect attorney–expert communications in
a PTAB proceeding may also leave such communications unprotected.27
In deciding the recent discovery dispute in Adobe Inc. v. RAH Color
Techs. LLC, the PTAB explained how its ruling was consistent with the
requirements of FRCP 26.28 In Adobe, the Petitioner attempted to use
FRCP 26(b)(4) as a shield to prevent the Patent Owner from compelling
expert testimony on whether the expert conducted any prior art
searches, considered certain evidence from the Patent Owner, or
determined that any reference combination did not render the

23. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee’s note).
24. See, e.g., Adobe Inc. v. RAH Color Techs. LLC, Nos. IPR2019-00627, -00628, -00629, 00646, Paper 59 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2019); Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., No.
IPR2018-01437, Paper 15 at 7 n.5 (P.T.A.B. July 10, 2019).
25. See, e.g., Adobe, Nos. IPR2019-00627, -00628, -00629, -00646, Paper 59 at 6-7 (compelling
a party to identify, inter alia, prior art references provided to an expert by counsel); Apple Inc. v.
Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc., Nos. IPR2013-00080, IPR2013-00081, Paper 66 at 6 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
31, 2014) (finding emails exchanged directly between experts discoverable).
26. GEA Process Eng’g, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., No. IPR2014-00041, Paper 52 at 5-7
(P.T.A.B. July 21, 2014).
27. See, e.g., Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., Inc., No. IPR2013-00358, Paper 52 at 3
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding that attorney work-product protections, but not attorney–client
protections apply to attorney–expert communications).
28. Adobe Inc. v. RAH Color Techs. LLC, Nos. IPR2019-00627, -00628, -00629, -00646, Paper
59 at 8 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 12, 2019).
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challenged claim obvious.29 The PTAB explained that under both 37 CFR
§ 42.65(a) and FRCP 26(b)(4), these topics were fair game because they
were facts and data considered by the expert in coming to his opinion,
rather than the substance of attorney–expert communication.30
If a party’s counsel provides evidence to an expert, that party may
not be able to rely on privilege or work-product protections to avoid
disclosing the substance of communications between counsel and the
expert regarding that evidence.31 In Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding
Co., Inc., the Patent Owner’s expert testified in a deposition that he had
no personal knowledge of two photographs provided to him by counsel
that he relied on his declaration.32 The Patent Owner instructed its
expert not to answer questions related to communications with counsel
regarding the photographs, so the Petitioner moved for additional
discovery, arguing “that the substance of what Patent Owner’s counsel
told [its expert] about the photographs is relevant to whether [the
expert] has sufficient personal knowledge to make the statements in his
declaration.”33 Patent Owner responded that the substance of the
expert’s discussions with Patent Owner’s counsel was privileged and
also protected under FRCP 26(b)(4).34 Notably, the Schott opinion never
addressed the Patent Owner’s FRCP 26(b)(4) argument, but
nonetheless found that work-product protection may apply and ordered
additional briefing.35 Although the parties ultimately resolved this
dispute without further intervention, Schott shows that experts should
not only be familiar with evidence provided by counsel and cited in their
declarations, but should also independently verify that evidence, when
possible.
As noted above, the PTAB has also found that communications
between two experts can be discoverable. In Apple Inc. v. Achates
Reference Publishing, Inc., expert deposition testimony “indicate[d] that
[the experts] exchanged emails regarding the challenged patents and
prior art, and at least considered the statements in those emails (in
addition to the other individual’s declaration) in forming their opinions
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 4-5, 7 (granting discovery on “the identity of the documents [expert] reviewed and
considered for his testimony” including prior art searches and claim charts).
31. See Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., Inc., No. IPR2013-00358, Paper 52 at 2
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2-3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C)).
35. Id. at 3-4.
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regarding the alleged patentability of the challenged claims over that
prior art.”36 The PTAB concluded that these emails were not expert
declaration drafts and were not protected by any privilege, because they
formed a basis for the experts’ opinions under 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1).37
In another PTAB proceeding, the Board ordered that certain expert
declaration drafts were discoverable and should be produced to the
opposing party, and were not subject to work-product protections.38
While the facts in GEA Process Eng’g, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc. are
unusual, it forms part of the PTAB case law on evidentiary rulings from
which certain themes can be derived. Here, Patent Owner’s expert
authorized an omnibus declaration, which was then modified by Patent
Owner’s counsel to prepare and file five separate declarations from the
authorized omnibus declaration. But the expert initially testified that he
did not “decide[] which paragraphs would be included in each of the five
filed declarations” and “that [he] did not specifically authorize any of the
sentences or paragraphs in the single omnibus declaration to be
changed after his review.”39 In a later declaration, however, the expert
explained that he did have communications with counsel to “discuss[]
how the omnibus declaration might be split up into separate
declarations to be filed in each of the cases.”40
The PTAB ordered production of the omnibus declaration, because
“Petitioner has a strong interest in discovering any changes that were
made between the omnibus declaration that Patent Owner’s declarant
authorized and the five declarations that were actually filed because
those changes are relevant to the credibility of the declarations.”41
Moreover, the PTAB found that normal work-product draft protections
did not apply, because the alleged draft was the document that the
expert authorized to be filed, rather than the type of working draft
typically afforded work-product protection.42 As GEA Process
exemplifies, if an expert declaration gives the impression that it is
merely attorney argument masquerading as expert opinion, that
expert’s testimony may be afforded little or no credibility.
36. See Apple Inc. v. Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc., Nos. IPR2013-00080, -00081, Paper 66 at
6 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2014).
37. Id. at 7-8.
38. See GEA Process Eng’g, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., No. IPR2014-00041, Paper 52 at 6-7
(P.T.A.B. July 21, 2014).
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 7.
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Finally, the PTAB has found that a party’s failure to explicitly assert
“work-product” privilege to protect attorney–expert communications in
a PTAB proceeding may also leave such communications unprotected—
even if attorney–client privilege was asserted. In Schott, the Patent
Owner raised both attorney–client and attorney work-product
privilege, but the PTAB panel determined that attorney–client privilege
was inapplicable because Patent Owner’s Counsel did not represent the
expert, but that attorney work-product was relevant and properly
asserted.43 In Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., Petitioner’s
counsel had asserted only attorney–client privilege—and not workproduct privilege—in attempting to shield from discovery certain
attorney–expert communications that occurred prior to redirect
deposition testimony.44 But the PTAB found that the expert was not a
client of Petitioner’s counsel, so this privilege did not apply, leaving
these communications unprotected by privilege.45 Therefore, a
cautionary takeaway from Schott and Cisco is that counsel must always
ensure that the proper privilege protection is invoked, even if it means
asserting multiple privilege protections.
IV.

APPLYING ATTORNEY–EXPERT PROTECTIONS TO EXPERT
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY IN PTAB PROCEEDINGS

As previously indicated, expert declarations are not the only source
of expert testimony in a PTAB proceeding. Experts provide testimony
during deposition and PTAB Rules explicitly forbid a party from witness
coaching of cross-examination testimony during a deposition.46 Once
cross-examination is complete, however, counsel may discuss
testimony with the expert witness before redirect.47 Still, counsel should
minimize pre-redirect testimony discussions with expert witnesses,
because the content of these discussions may be discoverable.48
43. Schott Gemtron Corp. v. SSW Holding Co., Inc., No. IPR2013-00358, Paper 52 at 2-3
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2014) (finding that attorney work-product protections, but not attorney–client
protections, apply to attorney–expert communications).
44. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., No. IPR2018-01437, Paper 15 at 6-7 (P.T.A.B.
July 10, 2019).
45. Id. at 7 (“Petitioner has not shown that he is a ‘client’ such that the Break Discussions
would be privileged. Thus, we see no basis for blocking discovery on the Break Discussions on the
basis of attorney–client privilege”).
46. TPG at 127 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 42.1(b)).
47. Focal Therapeutics, Inc. v. Senorx, Inc., No. IPR2014-00116, Paper 19 at 2-3 (P.T.A.B. July
21, 2014) (deemed precedential on July 10, 2019).
48. Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Centripetal Networks, Inc., No. IPR2018-01437, Paper 15 at 7 (P.T.A.B.
July 10, 2019).
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In Cisco, the PTAB held that if Petitioner’s counsel provided the
expert with “any facts, evidence, or assumptions . . . in the Break
Discussions . . . Patent Owner is entitled to discovery on those matters”
through written interrogatories.49 The Board may exclude, or give little
weight, to redirect testimony that was elicited through excessive
coaching and/or leading questions.50 With the risk that pre-redirect
communications may become discoverable, attorneys considering
whether to elicit redirect testimony must evaluate whether an expert
can adequately respond to questions in a manner that supports that
party’s case without requiring significant coaching by the attorney.
V.

BEST PRACTICES TO PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS WITH EXPERTS
IN PTAB PROCEEDINGS

The stakes for written declarations and depositions in PTAB
proceedings can be high because these are often the only sources of
expert testimony that the PTAB will review. Although the processes for
preparing expert reports and depositions in district court litigation and
expert declarations in PTAB proceedings are similar, the protections
conferred on such preparations differ and can present traps for the
unwary.
Experts should always be intimately involved in the process of
preparing their declarations and reviewing all cited evidence so that the
expert declaration consists of the expert’s own analyses and opinions.
Under no circumstances should an expert simply review and adopt data,
methodology, or tests furnished to the expert by the attorneys without
independently verifying that information. The expert declaration should
provide expert views insulated from attorney advocacy. It is imperative
that the expert be able to truthfully claim authorship of the declaration
during cross-examination in a deposition and defend his or her own
opinions, formed by applying reliable principles and methods known to
an expert in the field. If the PTAB suspects that an expert is merely
parroting the words of counsel, the expert’s testimony will lose
credibility and risks being assigned little or no weight. While less
discovery is typically available in PTAB proceedings than in district
court litigation, the importance of protecting the expert record remains
49. Id.
50. See Universal Remote Control, Inc. v. Universal Elecs., Inc., No. IPR2014-01146, Paper 36
at 6, 7 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 10, 2015) (granting a motion to exclude redirect testimony because “[t]he three
questions that were asked of [the expert] on re-direct examination are impermissible leading
questions under Federal Rule of Evidence 611.”).
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paramount. Counsel must be aware of pitfalls, to ensure expert
discovery protections are not unwittingly waived in any forum.

